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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Undue Burden.”  This is the single phrase that has shaped the 
landscape of abortion jurisprudence for the past twenty-five years.1  With 
these two, unclear words, the Supreme Court heightened support for the 
state’s ability to regulate a woman’s access to abortion.2  However, as 
courts have worked to decipher what constitutes an undue burden, 
legislatures have worked around the phrase’s vagueness to continually 
chip away at a woman’s right to an abortion.3  Without clarification on 
the meaning of undue burden, the phrase has served as a mechanism for 
increasing the number and type of regulations that restrict abortion 
access. 
In 2014, approximately 926,200 abortions were performed,4 and 788 
abortion clinics operated in the United States.5  While abortions remain a 
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 1.   See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted) (creating the test for the Constitutionality of an abortion regulation as one that 
determines whether there is an “undue burden on a woman’s ability to make [a decision regarding an 
abortion]”); see also infra Part II.A. 
 2.   See Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey 
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2025 (1994) (arguing that the Court’s 
failure to describe methods to determine the existence of an undue burden on abortion made the 
protection of a woman’s right to a pre-viability abortion unclear); see also Leading Case, Fourteenth 
Amendment–Due Process Clause–Undue Burden–Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 397, 397 (2016) (noting that after Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, “[w]hat exactly constituted an undue burden was unclear[]”) [hereinafter Harvard Leading 
Case Comment]. 
 3.   See infra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 4.   Fact Sheet, Guttmacher Institute, Induced Abortion in the United States (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states. 
 5.   Id. 
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prominent option for women wanting to terminate a pregnancy, 
legislatures have enacted almost 300 abortion regulations since 2011.6  In 
conjunction with these additional regulations, abortion clinics have been 
closing at a record pace, even in states considered to be “abortion-
friendly.”7  Currently, a woman in the United States waits an average of 
8.5 days to receive an abortion appointment.8  Thus, with the influx of 
abortion opponents taking measures to limit access to abortion, the extent 
of the abortion right hangs in the balance. 
Since the 1973 seminal case Roe v. Wade established a woman’s 
right to an abortion,9 the subject has been a topic of controversy.  As 
such, the landscape of abortion jurisprudence frequently fluctuates.  A 
woman’s right to have an abortion has gone from being a fundamental 
right—requiring evaluation of laws impacting the right under strict 
scrutiny—to a protected liberty interest—requiring a nuanced, ever-
changing, and oftentimes misunderstood form of scrutiny.10  The 
uncertainty of the undue burden analysis—first articulated in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey11—has led the Supreme Court and lower courts to 
grapple with how to appropriately apply the undue burden test.  
However, a clear method of evaluating Casey’s undue burden analysis 
has not emerged.  Instead, each new decision on the constitutionality of 
abortion legislation comes with new approaches that complicate, rather 
than clarify, the proper approach to abortion jurisprudence. 
This confusion has continued for over twenty years since Casey.  On 
June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court added to this perplexing jurisprudence 
when it struck down Texas abortion regulations in its most significant 
decision in two decades, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.12  Not 
only does this decision represent continued recognition of the importance 
                                                          
 6.   Esmé E. Deprez, U.S. Abortion Rights Fight, BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/abortion-and-the-decline-of-clinics. 
 7.   Danielle Paquette, Why Abortion Clinics in the U.S. Are Rapidly Closing, WASH. POST; 
WONKBLOG (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/25/why-
americas-abortion-clinics-are-rapidly-closing/. 
 8.   Cheryl Sullenger, Special Report: 2015 Abortion Clinic Survey Reveals 81% of Abortion 
Clinics Closed Since 1991, OPERATION RESCUE (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.operationrescue.org/ 
archives/special-report-2015-abortion-clinic-survey-reveals-81-of-abortion-clinics-closed-since-
1991/. 
 9.  410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 10.   See infra, Part II (discussing the history of abortion jurisprudence).  
 11.  505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 12.  136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); see also Harvard Leading Case Comment, supra note 2 at 405–06 
(noting that while Whole Woman’s Health has started to clarify how to apply the undue burden 
standard to health-justified abortion regulations, it is not clear how well the opinion will translate to 
restrictions “that fit less neatly into a cost-benefit framework”). 
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of protecting a woman’s abortion right, but it also provides guidance on 
the appropriate application of the undue burden standard.  By 
demonstrating approval of a balancing test,13 Whole Woman’s Health 
begins to clarify how to analyze an undue burden and lends itself to an 
appropriate revision of the process courts use to evaluate the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations.  Specifically, drawing from the 
Court’s analysis in Whole Woman’s Health, this Comment argues that 
determining an abortion regulation’s constitutionality should begin with 
scrutiny of the purpose under a heightened form of rational basis and 
conclude with a balancing test of the regulation’s burdens and benefits to 
account for the relationship between the law’s purpose and effects.  This 
reflects a protection of a woman’s liberty interest in her right to an 
abortion that follows court precedent and fits within the realm of broader 
liberty-interest jurisprudence. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of abortion 
jurisprudence in the United States—focusing on the development of the 
undue burden test, contradictory approaches to the test, and an in-depth 
explanation of the Court’s balancing approach in Whole Woman’s 
Health.  Part III explains that, following Whole Woman’s Health, the 
most workable and appropriate form of the undue burden standard is a 
“Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test”14 that first analyzes whether a 
law passes the more stringent rational basis with bite test and then 
considers whether the benefits created by the law outweigh any burden 
the law places on a woman’s access to an abortion.  Additionally, Part III 
explains how to apply the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test and 
illustrates an application of the test to dismemberment abortion bans to 
demonstrate how the test protects a woman’s liberty interest in the right 
to an abortion by appropriately determining when undue burdens exist. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Although the heart of abortion jurisprudence spans less than fifty 
years, controversial decisions and alternating approaches to analyzing the 
constitutionality of laws permeate this timeframe.  Initially recognized as 
                                                          
 13.   See infra, Part II.B.3. 
 14.   Victor Rosenblum, a Northwestern University School of Law professor, is credited with 
creating the phrase “rational basis with teeth.”  See David O. Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection 
Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, 108, 112, 114 (1985).  “Rational basis with bite” is used more 
frequently than “rational basis with teeth” to refer to the application of this heightened scrutiny.  See 
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972) (“Moreover, the outcomes of the fifteen 
basic cases suggest that the equal protection clause retains considerable bite.”). 
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a fundamental right subject to the most rigorous scrutiny, a woman’s 
right to an abortion has transformed into a liberty interest.  With this 
transformation, the Supreme Court developed the undue burden standard 
to determine whether a law violates the liberty interest in a right to an 
abortion.  Courts, however, have struggled to decipher and apply the test 
for an undue burden consistently.15  This opened the door for the 
Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health to clarify the method for 
evaluating the constitutionality of abortion laws—the use of a balancing 
test. 
A. The Creation of the Undue Burden Standard 
Courts have not always used the undue burden standard.  Instead, the 
standard developed as the Supreme Court refined abortion jurisprudence 
through decisions on various types of abortion laws.  Beginning with Roe 
v. Wade, the Supreme Court began creating current abortion 
jurisprudence and paved the way for establishing the undue burden 
standard. 
1. The Beginning of Current Abortion Jurisprudence in Roe v. Wade 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade.16  This decision 
marked the first of many momentous outcomes that altered abortion 
jurisprudence.  Heralded as the key, but probably most controversial, 
decision for abortion rights, Roe v. Wade recognized that the right to 
terminate a pregnancy is within the fundamental right to privacy 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.17  The 
Supreme Court held the Constitution protects the right to terminate a 
pregnancy prior to viability—when a fetus can survive outside the 
womb.18 
By finding women have the fundamental right to pre-viability 
abortions, the Court had to resolve how to protect this right.  Under the 
jurisprudence at the time, laws affecting the fundamental right to privacy 
were subject to strict scrutiny.19  Therefore, once the Court determined 
                                                          
 15.   See Metzger, supra note 2, at 2035–38 (discussing the weaknesses in the undue burden 
standard, and specifically noting that “the failure to develop a methodical analysis of the undue 
burden standard perpetuates the inconsistency of rulings on abortion”). 
 16.   410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 17.   Id. at 153. 
 18.   Id. at 163–64. 
 19.   See id. at 155 (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that 
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that 
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the right to privacy encompassed a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy, it followed that abortion regulations would be subject to strict 
scrutiny.20  Thus, regulations limiting the abortion right could only be 
justified by a compelling state interest and needed to be narrowly tailored 
to achieve the interest.21  The Court clarified, however, that the right to 
an abortion “is not absolute and is subject to some limitations” and that 
states retain some interest in protecting women’s health.22  This resulted 
in the Court dividing the pregnancy into three trimesters to specify the 
extent of the right—during the first trimester, the state could not prohibit 
abortions; during the second, the state could regulate abortions to protect 
maternal health; and during the third, the state could prohibit abortions to 
demonstrate the state’s interest in human life, except those abortions 
necessary to save the mother’s life.23  While Roe demonstrated the 
Court’s recognition of women’s reproductive rights, in the years after 
Roe, uncertainty clouded whether the Supreme Court would continue 
down this path or if the decision would be overturned—allowing states to 
prohibit abortions.24 
2. Creation and Approval of the Undue Burden Standard 
a. Developing the Undue Burden in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
In 1992, less than twenty years after Roe, the Court revisited the 
landscape of abortion jurisprudence.25  Since Roe, Justices Souter and 
Thomas had replaced two of Roe’s supporters, Justices Brennan and 
Marshall; many thought this change in the Court’s composition would 
                                                          
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at 
stake.”) (citations omitted). 
 20.   Id. at 153–56. 
 21.   Id. at 155–56.  
 22.   Id. at 155. 
 23.   Id. at 164–65. 
 24.   See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 859 (5th ed. 
2015).  The Court’s decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services indicated that four justices 
were in favor of overruling Roe.  Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Kennedy 
wrote a plurality opinion attacking the trimester distinctions in Roe.  Id. (citing Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989)).  In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia 
suggested that Roe needed to be overruled explicitly.  Id. (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).  However, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and 
Marshall expressed concern over reversing Roe and noted in their dissent that “the signs [of 
overturning Roe] are evident and very ominous.”  Id. at 860 (citing Webster, 410 U.S. at 537, 557, 
560 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
 25.   See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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result in an overruling of Roe.26  However, with its decision in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court 
modified traditional abortion analysis of Roe but did not reverse the 
decision.27  Casey represents the end of recognizing abortion as a 
fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny.28  Instead, the Court changed 
course by deciding that a woman’s abortion right is a “protected liberty 
interest.”29 
While the Casey plurality did not overrule Roe,30 the Court adopted 
the “undue burden” analysis to determine the constitutionality of 
abortion regulations.31  In a 5-4 decision, the Court retained and 
reaffirmed Roe’s central holdings—a woman has the right to obtain an 
abortion before viability without “undue interference from the State,” the 
state has “legitimate interests from the outset of pregnancy in protecting 
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus,” and the state retains 
power to limit post-viability abortions.32  Under Casey, the state retained 
the power to restrict post-viability abortions so long as exceptions existed 
in situations where an abortion is necessary to protect the health or life of 
the woman seeking an abortion.33 
Even with an affirmation of Roe, the Court abandoned Roe’s 
trimester framework by recognizing an increased importance in the 
state’s interest in protecting the life of the unborn.34  The Court replaced 
                                                          
 26.   See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 860.  
 27.   505 U.S. at 846 (retaining and reaffirming “the essential holding of” Roe v. Wade); Khiara 
M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 915, 917 (2010). 
 28.   See Karen A. Jordan, The Emerging Use of a Balancing Approach in Casey’s Undue 
Burden Analysis, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 657, 664 (2015). 
 29.  See David L. Rosenthal, Article, Refocusing the Undue Burden Test: Inconsistent 
Interpretations Pose a Substantial Obstacle to Constitutional Legislation, 31 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 9–
10 (2016).  As the Court moved away from using the label fundamental rights, the recognition of 
abortion rights as a liberty interest fits within the jurisprudence of the time.  See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., 
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269, 278–79 (1990) (describing bodily integrity and the right for 
a competent person to refuse medical treatment as a protected liberty interest and applying a 
balancing test); see also infra Part III.C.4.a.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 859. 
 30.   See Jordan, supra note 28, at 660. 
 31.   Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–77 (plurality opinion). 
 32.   Id. at 846 (majority opinion).  While the Court announced that it retained the central 
holding of Roe v. Wade, Casey abandoned the strict scrutiny standard the Court applied to abortion 
in Roe and altered the framework for analyzing abortion regulations to be more permissive.  Linda J. 
Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J. 
L. & FEMINISM 317, 330 (2006).  
 33.   Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 34.   Id. at 873 (plurality opinion) (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not 
consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe. . . . The trimester framework suffers from these 
basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in 
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the trimester framework with the undue burden analysis to “assess 
whether state regulation bearing on pre-viability abortion is a permissible 
or impermissible infringement of a woman’s protected liberty interest.”35  
Under the undue burden analysis, a finding of an undue burden means 
that a state’s abortion regulation creates a substantial obstacle to a 
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion of a nonviable fetus either through 
its purpose or effect.36  Thus, abortion regulations with the purpose of 
creating a substantial obstacle are invalid because the mechanism for 
advancing interest in potential life must be developed to inform, rather 
than hinder, a woman’s free choice.37  Similarly, a statute with the 
legitimate purpose of furthering a valid state interest, which still has the 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle on a woman’s choice to have an 
abortion, also creates an undue burden.38  Therefore, a state may enact 
regulations to encourage a woman to learn about arguments against 
having an abortion and to provide a workable framework for a woman 
making a decision regarding her pregnancy.39 
Through its decision in Casey, the Court opened the doors for 
abortion jurisprudence to provide for abortion regulations advancing 
legitimate state interests.  Specifically, Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority, explained that the state has legitimate interests in protecting 
women’s health and protecting the life of the unborn child.40  The Court 
recognized these legitimate interests justify government regulation of 
abortion access, procedures, providers, and facilities.41  Thus, these 
interests allow the state to enact abortion regulations that limit a 
woman’s right to an abortion.42  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor 
explained the central issue created by abortion regulations is interference 
with a woman’s right to make the ultimate decision of whether or not to 
have an abortion.43  Therefore, so long as they do not create an undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to elect to have an abortion and are 
                                                          
practice it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 35.   Jordan, supra note 28, at 663. 
 36.   Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion) (stating that “[a] finding of an undue burden is a 
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”).  
 37.   Id. 
 38.   See id. 
 39.   Id. at 872–73. 
 40.   Id. at 846 (majority opinion). 
 41.   Jordan, supra note 28, at 661 & n.14.  
 42.   See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76 (plurality opinion). 
 43.   Id. at 877. 
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reasonably related to the state’s legitimate goal, abortion regulations may 
reflect the state’s interest in improving women’s health or protecting the 
life of the unborn child and may be designed to persuade a woman to 
choose not to have an abortion.44 
As a result, in applying its undue burden test, the Court held a 
Pennsylvania statutory provision requiring a woman to provide spousal 
notice unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause because it 
enabled a husband to control, and essentially veto, his wife’s choice to 
have an abortion.45  However, the Court upheld the statute’s 24-hour 
waiting period provision, informed consent provision, parental consent 
provision, and record-keeping provision because these did not impose an 
undue burden.46  By rejecting Roe’s application of strict scrutiny to 
abortion regulations, Casey resulted in states having more leeway to 
regulate abortions, which led to an increase in abortion laws.47  These 
laws include those pertaining to informed consent, waiting periods, 
parental approval, and Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers 
(“TRAP”).48  With the ability to enact these laws, states gained the 
ability to chip away at a woman’s abortion right by enacting laws 
impacting abortion access, but not imposing an undue burden.49 
b. Application of the Undue Burden Standard in Stenberg v. Carhart 
and Gonzales v. Carhart 
Although only three Justices urged the application of the undue 
burden standard to abortion laws in Casey, in later decisions a majority 
of Justices embraced the undue burden standard.  In Stenberg v. Carhart, 
the majority announced its approval of the undue burden test, and the 
                                                          
 44.   Id. at 878. 
 45.   Id. at 897–98 (majority opinion). 
 46.   Id. at 881–87, 889–901 (plurality opinion).  
 47.   Nina Martin, The Supreme Court Decision That Made a Mess of Abortion Rights, MOTHER 
JONES (Feb. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/02/supreme-court-
decision-mess-abortion-rights; see also Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance Judicial Review of 
Abortion, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1293 (2013) (stating that “when first articulated, [the undue 
burden standard] was never a particularly tough defender of the abortion right”).  
 48.   Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 
118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1339–44 (2009) (discussing the change of abortion laws following Casey and 
how abortion opponents have tested the limits of Casey).  TRAP laws are regulations directed 
specifically at abortion providers and include laws that: (1) single out abortion providers for 
medically unnecessary regulations, standards, and requirements; (2) needlessly address licensing of 
abortion clinics or charge large registration fees; or (3) unnecessarily regulate where abortions can 
occur.  ACLU, What TRAP Laws Mean for Women, 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/TRAP_FAQ_FactSheet.pdf. 
 49.   ACLU, supra note 48. 
2017 MAKING SENSE OF WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 765 
Court applied the test to declare a Nebraska law prohibiting partial birth 
abortions unconstitutional.50  Specifically, the Court noted “the law lacks 
any exception ‘for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother,’”51 
and that even with the existence of this exception, the law still imposed 
an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate a pre-viability 
pregnancy.52  Notably, the Court looked to the law’s unintended effect—
a prohibition of the common pre-viability dilation and evacuation 
abortion procedure—and found this created a substantial obstacle and 
therefore imposed an undue burden on a woman’s abortion right.53 
Following Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart used the 
undue burden test again when evaluating a federal law prohibiting partial 
birth abortions.54  In Gonzales, however, the Court found that the partial 
birth abortion ban was constitutional because it did not impose an undue 
burden.55  The Court first considered whether the law’s purpose was to 
create a substantial obstacle and concluded that it was not.56  Instead, the 
Court recognized the validity of the law reflecting the legitimate interest 
in protecting the unborn.57  Additionally, the Court considered whether 
the law’s effects resulted in creating an “unconstitutional burden” by not 
including a health exception, again finding the absence of this burden.58  
Thus, the Court upheld the regulation, as it did not create an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.59 
B. The Development of a Balancing Approach to the Undue Burden 
Standard 
1. Different Interpretations of the Undue Burden Standard 
Over time, the undue burden standard developed in Casey has been 
subject to differing interpretations and applications from the lower 
                                                          
 50.   530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000). 
 51.   Id. at 930 (alteration in original) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 52.   Id. at 948 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 53.   See id. at 929 (majority opinion); id. 948–50 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 54.   550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). 
 55.   Id. 
 56.   Id. at 156. 
 57.   See id. at 158 (noting that banning partial-birth abortions furthers the government 
objectives because the procedure is “laden with the power to devalue human life”); see also Jordan, 
supra note 28, at 666 (explaining how Gonzales reflected the Court’s recognition of the legislatures’ 
ability to advance legitimate state interests).  
 58.   Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161–65. 
 59.   Id. at 168. 
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courts.60  Prior to Whole Woman’s Health, divisions arose as to how to 
appropriately apply Casey’s undue burden test.61  Some courts have 
applied the undue burden test with a rational basis standard of review, 
while others use heightened scrutiny.62  Furthermore, while some courts 
have examined both an abortion regulation’s purpose and effect, others 
ignore the putative purpose of the law and only look to the effect of the 
legislation.63  Additionally, a two-part balancing approach encompassing 
an initial standard of review, which the Supreme Court implicitly 
demonstrated in Whole Woman’s Health,64 has garnered much discussion 
and criticism.65 
The primary division to understanding the undue burden standard 
occurs when courts evaluate whether a law creates a substantial obstacle 
to abortion access, even when the law has a legitimate purpose.  The 
language in Casey describing an undue burden is internally contradictory 
and does not explicitly indicate balancing as suggested by the name 
undue burden.  By equating an undue burden with something having the 
purpose or effect of creating a “substantial obstacle,” the plurality did not 
indicate that a burden is “undue” because it is excessive in light of its 
benefits.66  Furthermore, the language in Casey also creates confusion 
around the meaning of substantial obstacle; Casey prohibits laws with 
“the purpose or effect” of creating substantial obstacles,67 but at times 
only references the effect of creating a substantial obstacle.68  While 
some circuits developed an understanding of the undue burden inquiry to 
involve balancing benefits and burdens, four circuits approached this 
                                                          
 60.   Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 9–10; Kali Ann Trahanas, Comment, How the Undue Burden 
Standard is Eroding Informed Consent, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 231, 260–61 (2013). 
 61.   John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852–53 
(2015) [hereinafter Science Disputes in Abortion Law]. 
 62.   See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the differing approaches to analysis of the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations). 
 63.   Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 12 (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 
738 F.3d 786, 799 (7th Cir. 2013); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 179 
(4th Cir. 2009)). 
 64.   See infra Part II.B.3. 
 65.   See Jordan, supra note 28, at 718–20 (providing critiques of courts using the balancing 
approach). 
 66.   See Metzger, supra note 2, at 2034 (discussing how the use of balancing is implied by the 
name “undue burden,” but that Casey “only analyzes the quantity of burdens imposed”). 
 67.   Harvard Leading Case Comment, supra note 2 at 397 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 68.   Id.  
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analysis without any balancing.69  Under the non-balancing approach, 
courts only inquire as to whether the legitimate purpose promoted by the 
law creates a substantial obstacle to women seeking an abortion.70  
Whether a law successfully achieves its legitimate interest has no bearing 
on the law being upheld.71  Therefore, under this method, so long as it 
has a legitimate purpose and is free of substantial obstacles, an abortion 
regulation does not create an undue burden. 
Courts applying a balancing test, however, do the opposite and 
scrutinize the relationship between an abortion regulation’s benefits and 
the burdens.  The Seventh and Ninth Circuit both adopted the use of the 
balancing test to consider the extent to which a law advances its 
purported legitimate interest in light of any burdens it places on a 
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.72 Applying a balancing test to the 
undue burden standard consists of two parts.73  First, the legislation 
regulating abortion must be related to a legitimate state interest under a 
rational basis analysis.74  Second, the legislation “must not have the 
‘practical effect of imposing an undue burden’ on the ability of women to 
obtain abortions.”75  To determine whether this practical effect exists, 
courts examine the legislative purpose and practical effect of the 
regulation together76 to balance the state’s interests with a woman’s right 
to abortion.77 
Under the balancing inquiry, a court weighs the regulation’s burdens 
on a woman against the regulation’s benefits.  Using this analysis, a court 
deems a regulation unconstitutional when the burden a law imposes on a 
woman’s right to an abortion outweighs the state’s justifications for the 
law.78  This generates a scale, whereby a regulation generating high 
                                                          
 69.   Science Disputes in Abortion Law, supra note 61, at 1853–55.  The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Circuits do not employ a balancing test when determining whether an undue burden 
exists.  Id. at 1853. 
 70.   Id. 
 71.   Id. 
 72.   See id. at 1854; see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F. 3d 905, 914 
(9th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 799 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 73.   See, e.g., Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 795–99 (demonstrating the law first must pass the 
rational basis analysis and then must not create an undue burden). 
 74.   Id. at 800 (Manion, J., concurring); Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 20. 
 75.   Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 799, 800 (Manion, J., concurring) (quoting Karlin v. Foust, 188 
F.3d 446, 481 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 76.   Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 20–21. 
 77.   Humble, 753 F.3d at 912 (“The undue burden test seeks to balance [state] interests with a 
woman’s fundamental right to abortion.”). 
 78.   Id. at 914; Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 795–98 (explaining the analysis of the benefits and the 
burdens of an abortion regulation requiring admitting privileges). 
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benefits for a legitimate state interest requires those opposing the law to 
demonstrate sufficiently high burdens on a woman’s right to access an 
abortion.79  Similarly, if the law confers small benefits to a state interest, 
it may be unconstitutional with a demonstration of equally small 
burdens.80 
2. Circuit Court Applications of the Balancing Test 
Judge Richard Posner is often noted for applying what is now the 
balancing test approach to analyzing the constitutionality of an abortion 
regulation.81  In Van Hollen, Wisconsin enacted an abortion regulation 
requiring admitting privileges for doctors and justified the requirement 
on the basis of protecting women’s health.82  After looking at the 
evidentiary basis for requiring admitting privileges for doctors 
performing abortions and evaluating the regulation’s benefits and 
burdens, Posner concluded the regulation violated a woman’s right to an 
abortion.83  He expressed his application of balancing in the undue 
burden test with the following: 
The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even if slight, 
to be ‘undue’ in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous.  It is not a 
matter of the number of women likely to be affected. . . . In this case 
the medical grounds thus far presented . . . are feeble, yet the burden 
great because of the state’s refusal to have permitted abortion providers 
a reasonable time within which to comply.84 
With this explanation, Judge Posner articulated how the balancing 
method of analyzing abortion laws involves an assessment of the 
evidence provided to support the grounds for enacting the legislation and 
offered to demonstrate the effect of the law.85 
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, the Ninth 
Circuit used a balancing approach to determine that a preliminary 
injunction for an Arizona law restricting how medical personnel could 
                                                          
 79.   See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. 
 80.   See id. 
 81.   Jordan, supra note 28, at 667–72. 
 82.  738 F.3d at 789; Jordan, supra note 28, at 667. 
 83.   See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798 (noting that the medical grounds presented at the time 
were feeble, and that because the statute did not give abortion providers a reasonable time to comply, 
the regulation resulted in a great burden on abortion access). 
 84.   Id.  
 85.   See Jordan, supra note 28, at 669. 
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use certain medications to perform abortions was appropriate.86  After 
assuming the Arizona law passed rational basis review,87 the court 
analyzed the law’s benefits and burdens.88  In its benefits analysis, the 
court found weak justification for the law based on Arizona’s lack of 
evidence demonstrating “the law furthers any interest in women’s 
health.”89  In contrast, when considering the law’s burdens, the court 
noted evidence of women’s preference for medical over surgical 
abortions, increased costs for medication abortions, potential closures of 
abortion clinics, increased distances required for women to travel, and 
delays for women to receive abortions creating health risks.90  Balancing 
these burdens and benefits led the court to find the Arizona law’s 
burdens not justified by any interest.91 
3. Supreme Court Approval of a Balancing Analysis: Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt 
As discussed above, prior to Whole Woman’s Health, lower courts 
began analyzing certain abortion regulations aimed to serve a state’s 
interest in health and safety with a balancing test approach.92  Before 
Whole Woman’s Health, scholars predicted the necessity of the Court 
clarifying how to properly analyze abortion regulations.93  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health confirmed the use of a 
balancing test to discern whether an undue burden exists and thus 
determine the constitutionality of abortion regulation.94 
                                                          
 86.  753 F.3d 905, 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 87.   Id. at 914.  This Comment proposes that rational basis review is inappropriate to determine 
whether a legitimate purpose exists for an abortion regulation.  Instead, courts should use a Rational 
Basis with Bite analysis to first determine whether a purpose is legitimate before applying the 
balancing test.  See infra Part III. 
 88.   Humble, 753 F.3d at 914–16. 
 89.   Id. at 914–15. 
 90.   Id. at 915–16. 
 91.   Id. at 917. 
 92.   Jordan, supra note 28, at 666–78. 
 93.   See, e.g., Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis 
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279 (2013) (noting that the 
correct method of implementing the undue burden test is “murky” and that a “tangled body of 
abortion precedent” exists); Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 20–23 (identifying the existence of a circuit 
split in methods used to determine the existence of an undue burden); John Robertson, The Undue 
Burden Test in Texas’ Abortion Clinic Regulation, BALKINIZATION (June 16, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-undue-burden-test-in-texas-abortion.html (stating “[i]t is 
time for the Supreme Court to clarify the ‘undue burden’ test”) [hereinafter Undue Burden Test in 
Texas]. 
 94.   Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
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In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court found two provisions of the 
Texas Legislature’s House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”) that sought to regulate 
abortions to be unconstitutional.95  The controversy arose from Texas’s 
TRAP laws—which regulated and limited abortion by imposing medical 
regulations on abortion providers that are not applied to other medical 
providers.96  The Texas abortion provider, Whole Woman’s Health, and 
other abortion providers challenged the validity of the statutory 
admitting-privileges requirement for doctors performing abortions and 
the surgical-center requirement.97  The admitting-privileges requirement 
mandated that “[a] physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . 
must, on the date the abortion is performed or induced, have active 
admitting privileges at a hospital that . . . is located not further than 30 
miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.”98  
The surgical-center requirement mandated that “the minimum standards 
for an abortion facility must be equivalent to the minimum standards 
adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety Code section] for 
ambulatory surgical centers.”99  After analyzing each statute’s 
constitutionality, the Court found the statutes unconstitutional—neither 
created medical benefits great enough to justify the burdens they impose 
on a woman’s access to obtain an abortion.100  These burdens, the Court 
decided, created a substantial obstacle for women seeking pre-viability 
abortions, which in turn constituted an undue burden that forced the 
statutes to be unconstitutional.101 
a. The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Undue Burden Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s Whole Woman’s Health decision reversed the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, which found, 
in dicta, that Texas’s abortion regulations would not impose an undue 
burden.102  In Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, the Fifth Circuit applied 
                                                          
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Kendra Smale & Heidi Williamson, Infographic: The State of Abortion Restrictions After 
Whole Woman’s Health, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2016/08/17/142643/infographic-the-state-of-
abortion-restrictions-after-whole-womans-health/; see also supra note 48 (providing examples of 
TRAP law characteristics). 
 97.   Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300–01. 
 98.   Id. at 2300 (omissions and alteration in original). 
 99.   Id. (alteration in original). 
 100.   Id. 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   Id. at 2320, rev’g Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 583–90 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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the undue burden analysis without any balancing.103  The Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning represents one side of the existing circuit split created by the 
question of whether the undue burden analysis requires a balancing of 
benefits and burdens.104  In evaluating H.B. 2’s requirements, the Fifth 
Circuit first determined the law was rationally related to the legitimate 
purpose of protecting the health and welfare of women stated by the 
bill.105  Finding this, the court engaged in its analysis to determine the 
requirements did not create an undue burden.  First, under the purpose 
prong, the court found a clear legitimate purpose of providing high 
quality of care to women and protecting women’s health.106  Notably, the 
court explicitly rejected the argument that the effects of the law closing 
most abortion facilities demonstrated an impermissible purpose.107  Next, 
in evaluating the law’s effect, the Fifth Circuit criticized the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Texas’s focus on the 
balance between the burdens and utility of the regulation, which 
ultimately determined the law would not further the State’s interest.108  
Thus, the Fifth Circuit found H.B. 2’s requirements were constitutional, 
except as applied to one facility.109 
b. The Supreme Court’s Explanation of the Undue Burden Test 
The Supreme Court evaluated H.B. 2’s constitutionality by first110 
discussing the undue burden test as it believed it to be articulated in 
Casey.111  Specifically, the Court announced that the undue burden 
analysis charges courts with the obligation of considering the burdens a 
law imposes on a woman’s access to abortion in conjunction with the 
                                                          
 103.   See Cole, 790 F.3d at 572 (stating a law is constitutional under the undue burden standard 
if “(1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is reasonably related to (or designed to further) a 
legitimate state interest.”) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 530 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 104.   See Undue Burden Test in Texas, supra note 93 (noting the existence of a circuit split 
where the Seventh and Ninth Circuits apply a balancing test, while the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits reject the use of a balancing test). 
 105.   Cole, 790 F.3d at 584. 
 106.   Id. 
 107.   Id. at 585 (“[C]ourts ‘do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes 
produce harmful results.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).  
 108.   Id. at 586. 
 109.   Id. at 567. 
 110.   The Court began its analysis of the undue burden standard after addressing the issue of 
claim preclusion on plaintiffs’ claims and declaring that res judicata did not bar any claims.  Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2304–09 (2016). 
 111.   Id. at 2309. 
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benefits, or legitimate state interests, achieved by the regulation.112  
Furthermore, noting Casey, the Court explained the emphasis that courts 
must place on evidence and arguments occurring during trial as opposed 
to giving deference to legislative findings.113  For a court to appropriately 
use evidence presented at trial to determine whether an abortion 
regulation creates an undue burden, it should consider and weigh the 
evidence as opposed to replacing the legislature’s judgment with its 
own.114  Using this approach, the Supreme Court evaluated lower courts’ 
applications and analyses of the undue burden test. 
Without stating its use of the balancing approach to determine 
whether H.B. 2 created an undue burden, the Court’s evaluation of the 
legislation reflected a balancing test.  First, the Court looked at the 
purpose behind the regulation and its effects to determine the existence 
of any purported benefits to a legitimate state interest.115  Second, the 
Court looked to whether evidence demonstrated any “substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman’s choice.”116  Thus, the Court considered the 
burdens of the regulation in conjunction with the benefits promoted by 
the laws.117  With this explanation of the undue burden test, the Court 
flatly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey; the Fifth Circuit 
had mandated that courts provide rational basis deference to abortion 
legislation and should not “balance the wisdom or effectiveness of a law 
against the burdens the law imposes.”118 
c. Application of the Undue Burden Test to Texas’s Admitting-
Privileges Requirement 
In its application of the undue burden test, the Court found Texas’s 
admitting-privileges requirement in H.B. 2 unconstitutional.  The Court 
                                                          
 112.   Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–79 (1992) (plurality 
opinion)).  
 113.   Id. at 2310. 
 114.   Id. 
 115.   See id. at 2310–11. 
 116.   Id. at 2312 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion)). 
 117.   Id. at 2309. 
 118.   Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2014); see Whole Woman’s 
Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s test that “is wrong to equate the judicial 
review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict 
review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue”); see also Linda Greenhouse 
& Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After 
Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149, 154–56 (2016) (discussing how the Fifth Circuit 
refrained from using an evidentiary inquiry to determine whether the medical benefits supported the 
state’s claim of protecting a mother’s health outweighed the regulations’ burden).  
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concluded the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas was correct in finding that the legislation imposed an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.119  Texas argued the new 
regulation advanced the state’s “legitimate interest in protecting 
women’s health”120 because the purpose of the admitting-privileges 
requirement was to help guarantee women could easily access a hospital 
should any abortion complications arise.121  During its analysis, the Court 
evaluated whether the evidence presented at the district court level was 
sufficient for the district court to find that the new regulation created an 
undue burden on the woman’s right to choose.122  Based on the 
combination of expert testimonies and research studies presented to the 
district court, the Court first held that in comparison to the prior Texas 
law relating to admitting privileges, the new regulation did not do any 
more to advance the State’s legitimate interest in protecting women’s 
health.123  The Court found a lack of benefit in advancing the legitimate 
interest because a variety of evidence demonstrated that prior to the act’s 
passage, abortions resulted in low rates of complications and the State 
admitted it did not know of “a single instance [where] the new 
requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment.”124 
Following review of evidentiary findings on the law’s impact on 
advancing protections of women’s health, the Court looked at evidence 
of the admitting-privileges requirement’s creation of obstacles 
preventing a woman from exercising her choice with respect to an 
abortion.125  Evidence pointed to the relationship between the new 
admitting-privileges requirement and closure of abortion clinics.126  
Doctors had difficulty obtaining admitting privileges due to lack of 
necessity of transferring abortion patients to hospitals127 and inconsistent 
requirements to receive privileges.128  This was sufficient evidence to 
                                                          
 119.   Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
 120.   Id. at 2311. 
 121.   Id. 
 122.   See id. 
 123.   Id. 
 124.   Id. at 2311–12. 
 125.   Id. at 2312–14. 
 126.   Id. at 2312. 
 127.   Id. at 2312 (citing and discussing Brief of Amici Curiae Soc’y of Hospital Med. & Soc’y 
of OB/GYN Hospitalists in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 136 S. Ct. 499 
(2015) (No. 15-274)). 
 128.   Id. at 2312–13 (citing and discussing Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, Am. Med. Assoc., Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, Am. Osteopathic Assoc., & Am. 
Acad. of Pediatrics in Support of Petitioners, Cole, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) (No. 15-274), Brief of 
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support the notion that as a result of the new requirement half of Texas’s 
clinics closed, causing fewer doctors, increased wait times, and increased 
driving distance for women.129  In addition to finding no apparent health 
benefit of the regulation, the Court determined the evidence “adequately 
support[ed] the District Court’s ‘undue burden’ conclusion,” and found 
the admitting-privileges requirement unconstitutional.130 
d. Application of the Undue Burden Test to Texas’s Surgical-Center 
Requirements 
The Court applied the undue burden test to conclude that Texas’s 
surgical-center requirements in H.B. 2 were unconstitutional.  Similar to 
the proposed admitting-privileges regulations, the surgical-center 
requirement added heightened requirements to previously existing 
laws,131 and Texas argued it served the legitimate state interest of 
protecting women’s health.132  In evaluating the evidence presented in 
support of requiring abortion facilities to meet ambulatory surgical-
center standards, the Court found support for the notion that the 
requirement does not provide its purported benefits and is unnecessary.133  
Women receiving medical abortions obtain no benefit from surgical-
center requirements because potential complications almost always arise 
after leaving the facility;134 surgical abortions do not require the level of 
sterilization required for other surgeries;135 and complications arising 
following abortions most often require hospitalization rather than 
treatment that could be provided at a surgical center.136 
The Court continued examining evidence to evaluate whether the 
surgical-center requirements placed a “substantial obstacle” in a 
woman’s path to receive an abortion.  Here, sufficient evidence existed 
to support the notion that this requirement would have reduced the 
number of abortion facilities to seven or eight, which would have been 
                                                          
Amici Curiae Med. Staff Prof’ls in Support of Petitioners, Cole, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) (No. 15-
274)). 
 129.   Id. at 2313. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. at 2314.  Among others, these requirements included specifications relating to nursing 
staff size, building dimensions, and electrical and ventilation requirements.  Id. at 2314–15.  
 132.   See id. at 2315. 
 133.   Id. at 2315–16. 
 134.   Id. 
 135.   See id. at 2315–16 (“But abortions typically involve either the administration of medicines 
or procedures performed through the natural opening of the birth canal, which is itself not sterile.”). 
 136.   See id. at 2316. 
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unable to meet the abortion demand in Texas.137  Statistics demonstrated 
that clinics would have had to perform five times the number of 
abortions than they performed prior to the regulation.138  The cost 
increases that would have been required for currently licensed abortion 
facilities to meet standards of a surgical center and the increased capacity 
these facilities would have been forced to take on, indicated that any new 
licensed facilities per the new regulation would not make up for the lack 
of abortion facilities after closures occurred.139  Thus, the Court affirmed 
that the substantial obstacles to women seeking abortions outweigh the 
few, if any, benefits to women’s health conferred by the surgical-center 
requirement.140  In turn, this resulted in the Court finding that Texas’s 
surgical-center requirement created an undue burden and was 
unconstitutional.141 
e. The Dissent—A Departure from Casey’s Articulation of an Undue 
Burden? 
As expected with a Supreme Court decision on abortion, the case 
resulted in two dissents—one by Justice Thomas, the other by Justice 
Alito.142  While Justice Alito’s dissent focused on arguing that the Court 
should have dismissed petitioners’ claims on res judicata grounds,143 
Justice Thomas’s dissent specifically called attention to the majority’s 
application of the undue burden standard.144  According to Thomas’s 
dissent, the majority “radically” changed the undue burden test from 
Casey in three ways.145 
                                                          
 137.   Id. at 2316. 
 138.   Id. (“[T]he number of abortions that the clinics would have to provide would rise from 
‘14,000 abortions annually’ to ‘60,000 to 70,000’ . . . .” (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 
790 F.3d 563, 589–90 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (2016))). 
 139.   Id. at 2318. 
 140.   See id. 
 141.   Id. 
 142.   Id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
 143.   Id. at 2330–2342 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Alito further argued that the plaintiffs failed to 
show the admitting-privileges and surgical-center requirements caused the abortion facilities to close 
because other reasons existed for their closure.  Id. at 2342–50.  Alito’s dissent concluded by 
criticizing how the majority ignored the statute’s “extraordinarily broad severability clause” before 
enjoining parties.  Id. at 2350–53. 
 144.   Id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Whatever scrutiny the majority applies . . . it bears 
little resemblance to the undue-burden test the Court articulated in [Casey] and its successors.”). 
 145.   Id. at 2324 (noting that “[e]ven taking Casey as the baseline . . . the majority radically 
rewrites the undue-burden test.”). 
776 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
First, Justice Thomas pronounced that the majority’s utilization of a 
balancing test contradicts Casey.146  Instead of weighing benefits and 
burdens, Thomas described that in Casey, the question was whether there 
was a substantial obstacle, and that in post-Casey decisions, the Court 
specifically rejected considering a lack of benefits in its undue burden 
analysis.147  Second, Justice Thomas criticized the majority’s 
unwillingness to defer to legislative findings with respect to questions 
involving medical uncertainty.148  Thomas criticized the majority for 
relying on the evidence and arguments in judicial proceedings instead of 
trusting the legislature to resolve these questions.149  Third, he noted how 
the majority requires states to demonstrate by more than a rational basis 
the law’s connection to a legitimate interest even in the absence of 
substantial burdens on a woman’s access to an abortion.150  Although the 
majority did not specify its specific standard of review, Justice Thomas 
commented how the majority increased the states’ burden to a level that 
looks similar to strict scrutiny rejected in Casey.151 
Whole Woman’s Health now exists as the most recent and 
controlling Supreme Court Case in abortion jurisprudence.  While the 
decision itself does not offer an explicit explanation of the undue burden 
test, it provides a platform to decipher a clear test to use when applying 
the undue burden standard to laws restricting abortions. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Whole Woman’s Health allowed the Court to provide further insight 
as to how to apply the undue burden standard to determine the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations.  In its articulation of a balancing 
of burdens and benefits of an abortion regulation to determine the 
existence of an undue burden, the Court offered support for a more 
rigorous analysis of abortion regulations.  Building on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health, courts should use a Rational 
Basis with Bite Balancing Test to evaluate abortion regulations to 
                                                          
 146.   Id. 
 147.   Id. at 2324–25 (“Mazurek also deemed objections to the law’s lack of benefits ‘squarely 
foreclosed by Casey itself.’” (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (1997) (per 
curiam)).  
 148.   Id. at 2325  (“Before today, this Court had ‘given state and federal legislatures wide 
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.’” (quoting 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)). 
 149.   Id. 
 150.   Id. at 2325–26. 
 151.   Id. at 2326. 
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account for the protection of a woman’s liberty interest in a right to an 
abortion.  Under this formulation of the undue burden test, courts should 
first scrutinize an abortion regulation’s purpose with a heightened form 
of rational basis—Rational Basis with Bite—and conclude by balancing 
the regulation’s burdens and benefits to determine the strength of the 
relationship between the law’s purpose and effects.  This appropriately 
conforms to abortion and liberty interest jurisprudence, and in doing so 
protects a woman’s right to an abortion by invalidating unnecessary laws 
created with the purpose of creating a substantial obstacle to abortion 
access. 
A. The Much Needed End of Inconsistencies Among Courts Attempting 
to Apply the Undue Burden Standard to Abortion Regulations 
Whole Woman’s Health marks a clarification to, and a change in the 
direction of, the abortion jurisprudence landscape.  Whether the Court 
appropriately followed prior Supreme Court precedent has no bearing on 
the fact that now lower courts must follow the guidance of the Supreme 
Court in its analysis of the undue burden test when judging the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations.  By employing a balancing test 
to determine the existence of an undue burden, Whole Woman’s Health 
begins to appropriately address issues surrounding the constitutional 
methods for regulating abortions in an ever-changing society. 
As abortion regulations are highly politicized laws, the balancing test 
expressed in Whole Woman’s Health takes some controversy out of the 
decisions.  Instead of giving a high deference to the stated legislative 
rationale behind an abortion regulation, the balancing test appropriately 
replaces this deference with the requirement to examine hard evidence 
and statistics to consider whether a legitimate state interest is necessarily 
reached through a regulation or whether the state interest can be attained 
without harming a woman’s right to an abortion in the process.  This 
acknowledgement of a rigorous analysis is important because the 
Supreme Court’s decision comes at a time when it is difficult to find 
unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, reasons for enacting regulations 
that restrict abortions.152  Therefore, Whole Woman’s Health 
appropriately addresses a woman’s right to an abortion as a protected 
liberty interest, rather than something greater or lesser. 
Moreover, now that the Supreme Court has alluded to using an ends-
means scrutiny test combined with a balancing to determine if a law 
                                                          
 152.   Robertson, supra note 61, at 1852–53. 
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creates an undue burden, it is necessary to decipher how this multi-
faceted test should be explained and applied in the fluctuating 
jurisprudence of abortion regulations.  On the most fundamental level, 
the test for whether an abortion regulation constitutes an undue burden 
should be approached as a two-part test.  The first prong should consist 
of a moderately rigorous ends-means scrutiny evaluation—Rational 
Basis with Bite—and the second prong should consist of a balancing of 
burdens and benefits to determine whether or not an abortion regulation 
actually advances its purposes, or instead creates an undue burden, 
making the law unconstitutional. 
A test encompassing these elements achieves what the test’s name—
undue burden—suggests it should do as a test applied to determine the 
constitutionality of regulations impacting a woman’s liberty interest in 
the right to an abortion.  The phrase “undue burden” lends itself to the 
meaning that a burden on a woman’s right to an abortion is allowed, only 
if it is found to not be one that is “undue.”  Under Casey’s undue burden 
standard, which lower courts have struggled to apply since its inception, 
the Court created confusion as to what constitutes an undue burden.153  
Clarifying the undue burden test to require an explicit rational basis with 
bite analysis and balancing of burdens and benefits to determine whether 
a law truly furthers a legitimate purpose without imposing an undue 
burden helps alleviate this issue.154 
B. Developing a Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test 
Though not plainly stated in the opinion, Whole Woman’s Health 
lends itself to the development of an appropriately rigorous, two-part test 
to analyze the constitutionality of abortion regulation.  To initially 
determine whether the law is rationally or reasonably related to its 
purported purpose, the end-means scrutiny used should mirror “Rational 
Basis with Bite,” or “Rational Basis with Teeth.”155  This should then be 
followed by a burdens-benefits balancing test, which evaluates the law’s 
effects to determine whether it creates an undue burden—that is, whether 
                                                          
 153.   See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 863 (“The key question after Casey, Stenberg, and 
Gonzales v. Carhart is what constitutes an undue burden on the right to abortion.”); see also supra 
Part II.B.1–2.  
 154.   See Wharton et al., supra note 32, at 331–39 (arguing that Casey demonstrates the authors 
of the joint opinion intended to develop a rigorous standard that evaluates the effect of an abortion 
regulation on women and the government’s purpose in enacting the regulation). 
 155.   See supra note 14. 
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the benefits the law purports to achieve outweigh the obstacle placed in 
the path of a woman seeking to obtain an abortion. 
 
1. The Classic Ends-Means Scrutiny: Rational Basis with Bite 
Under the first part of this Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test, a 
court determines whether a rational basis exists for the piece of abortion 
legislation.  First, the party challenging the law must show the absence of 
a rational basis for the law.  Here, a court will determine if the legislature 
enacted the regulation solely based on a bare desire to harm a woman’s 
right to an abortion or to prevent a woman receiving an abortion.  As 
rational basis with bite is a form of ends-means scrutiny, the law’s 
purported end, or goal, must represent a legitimate purpose.  As 
established in Casey, two permissible legitimate purposes exist for 
abortion regulations—the state’s interest in protecting potential human 
life and the state’s interest in protecting women’s health.156  On the other 
hand, the mere purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman receiving an abortion is illegitimate.157  To demonstrate the law’s 
illegitimate purpose, the party opposing the law may point to, and the 
court may look to, the law’s legislative history and text to demonstrate 
the existence of an illegitimate purpose. 
If a court finds the existence of a bare desire to harm, then the 
analysis stops because this is not a legitimate purpose; and thus, the law 
is unconstitutional even without the application of the balancing.  On the 
other hand, if a bare desire to harm does not exist, the law must further 
be evaluated under the balancing prong of the Rational Basis with Bite 
Balancing Test to determine whether or not the law results in an undue 
burden on the right to an abortion. 
However, assuming the court finds the existence of a legitimate end, 
under the rational basis with bite test, the means must also be rationally 
or reasonably related to this end.158  A party opposing a regulation can 
demonstrate improper means by demonstrating the law’s irrationality 
through evidence pertaining to the over or under inclusiveness of the 
means or the availability of other alternatives to achieve the purported 
                                                          
 156.   Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 157.   See id.  
 158.   See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any 
Other Name, 62 IND. L. J. 779, 787–800 (1987) (discussing situations where the Court looked for a 
law’s legitimate purpose, but went on to apply a rational basis with bite analysis). 
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end.159  Evaluating both the ends and means is key because it may reveal 
whether the law’s purported purpose is mere pretext for a bare desire to 
harm a woman’s right to an abortion. 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Whole Woman’s Health reflects 
use of a rational basis with bite inquiry into an abortion regulation.  Her 
concurrence began by recognizing Texas’s argument that H.B. 2’s 
restrictions were constitutional because they served the legitimate 
purpose of protecting the health of women who experience abortion 
complications.160  The restrictions, however, did not have a strong 
connection to achieving this purpose.161  Ginsburg’s analysis of the 
constitutionality of the admitting-privileges and surgical-center 
requirements specifically called to attention evidence depicting the rarity 
of the complications and the discrepancy between the level of danger 
associated with abortion compared to other procedures lacking similar 
requirements.162  Here, evaluating both the ends and the means of the 
regulations led to the discovery that these laws did “little or nothing for 
health” and instead created barriers to abortion access.163  As such, the 
law’s means had no rational connection to the stated ends; instead, the 
regulations imposed barriers to abortion and were unconstitutional. 
2. The Final Undue Burden Consideration: A Balancing Act 
Assuming the law passes the above rational basis with bite test,164 a 
court should then conduct a balancing test to determine the 
constitutionality of the abortion law based on the determination of 
whether an undue burden exists.  The court should evaluate the law’s 
actual effects and determine the relationship between the purported 
benefits the law seeks to achieve and the incidental burdens it places on a 
woman’s right to abortion access.  The relationship found between the 
claimed beneficial purpose of the law and its actual effects is key to 
properly protecting a woman’s right to an abortion. 
In this Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test formulation, the 
balancing component consists of weighing abortion regulations’ benefits 
                                                          
 159.   See id. at 794. 
 160.   Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 161.   Id. at 2321. 
 162.   Id. at 2320–21.  
 163.   Id. at 2321 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 921 (7th 
Cir. 2015)).  
 164.   See supra Part III.B.1.  
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and the burdens.  This necessarily requires a court to undergo a two-part 
analysis—first, a measurement of both the benefits and the burdens 
generated by the law; and second, a weighing of the burdens and benefits 
to determine whether an undue burden exists.  In determining a law’s 
effects in the forms of the resulting benefits and burdens, the courts 
should conduct a highly fact-intensive analysis, looking at evidence such 
as expert testimony, empirical studies, and data.165 
Analyzing an abortion regulation’s burdens and benefits should 
consist of both the factual inquiry and a consideration of the strength of 
the relationship between the ends-means scrutiny as determined in the 
rational basis with bite analysis.  As suggested by courts using a 
balancing test in the abortion context, relevant facts to a regulation’s 
benefits and burdens include: the number of women likely affected by 
the regulation,166 resulting clinic closures, waiting times, cost changes, 
the law’s necessity, improvements to women’s health, and the number of 
complications resulting from a given procedure.167  Furthermore, courts 
should consider the strength of the correlation between an abortion 
regulation’s legitimate purpose and the means used to accomplish the 
purpose—as found in the rational basis with bite analysis—in evaluating 
the burdens a law imposes “together with”168 the benefits conferred by 
the law.  Here, a stronger correlation between the ends and means 
suggests a stronger benefit. 
After fully identifying burdens and benefits, a court should then 
conduct the balancing inquiry, which is where courts will have the most 
discretion.  Under the balancing inquiry, a court should “compare the 
extent of the burden a law imposes on a woman’s right to abortion with 
the strength of the state’s justification for the law.”169  When a law 
imposes a great burden on a woman’s right to an abortion, the state’s 
justification for enacting it must in turn be strong as demonstrated by the 
regulation’s necessity and its success at achieving its purpose.  
Conversely, the stronger a state’s justification for the law, the greater the 
burden must be before it becomes undue.  Concluding with this 
balancing test ultimately results in the Rational Basis with Bite 
Balancing Test ensuring that unnecessary regulations neither have the 
                                                          
 165.   See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing how Whole Woman’s Health looked to evidence of H.B. 
2’s burdens and benefits). 
 166.   Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 167.   Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2316–18. 
 168.   Id. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992)). 
 169.   Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912–14 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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purpose nor the effect of creating substantial obstacles constituting an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion. 
 
C. Support for the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test 
While the Court in Whole Woman’s Health did not explicitly state it 
applied a Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test to declare Texas’s 
laws unconstitutional, this test clarifies and improves upon the Court’s 
reasoning.  By completing separate inquiries for the purpose and effect of 
the law, this test promotes the idea that abortion regulations not only 
actually serve a legitimate state interest but that they are also necessary 
to do so.  In doing so, the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test 
appropriately protects a woman’s right to an abortion and falls within the 
broader realm of liberty interest jurisprudence. 
1. The Language of Whole Woman’s Health Suggests Using a Rational 
Basis with Bite Balancing Test 
The majority opinion in Whole Woman’s Health can be construed to 
reflect an implicit application of Rational Basis with Bite analysis, 
followed by an explicit balancing test.  The Court in Whole Woman’s 
Health identified both that a pure rational basis review was inappropriate 
to apply in the context of abortion regulations170 and the inherent 
necessity of a balancing test to evaluate whether an undue burden exists.  
By first identifying the purpose of the abortion regulations—protecting 
the mother’s health171—and evaluating the relationship between the 
regulation’s surgical-center and admitting-privileges requirement and its 
purpose, the Court engaged in an implicit rational basis with bite 
analysis.  Here, the Court stressed the importance of an actual connection 
between the regulations and Texas’s purported state interest.  Through 
this searching scrutiny, the Court recognized the attenuated connection 
between the end Texas stated as the regulation’s purpose and the means 
of achieving these ends—nothing suggested the new law advanced 
Texas’s legitimate interest in protecting women’s health.172 
                                                          
 170.   See Harvard Leading Case Comment, supra note 2, at 405 (“[T]he Whole Woman’s Health 
majority flatly and formally rejected rational basis review, requiring instead a more searching 
purpose analysis.”). 
 171.   Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 172.   See id. (“We have found nothing in Texas’ record evidence that shows that, compared to 
prior law (which required a ‘working arrangement’ with a doctor with admitting privileges), the new 
law advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health.”). 
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Following the implicit rational basis with bite analysis, the Court 
demonstrated the use of a balancing test identified as inherently 
necessary at the outset of the opinion.  To begin its discussion of the 
unconstitutionality of the regulations, the Court stated its conclusion that 
“neither [the surgical-center nor admitting-privilege requirements] 
confer[] medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access 
that each imposes.”173  To reach this conclusion, the Court found the laws 
created substantial obstacles to abortion access because of a decrease in 
the number of clinics available and a drop in the quality of care provided 
to patients.  These substantial obstacles equate to the burdens created by 
the laws.  Thus, the Court concluded that when it weighed these burdens 
against the minimal benefits created by the regulations, an undue burden 
existed. 
2. The Necessity of Using Rational Basis with Bite to Initially Evaluate 
an Abortion Regulation’s Purpose 
Using rational basis with bite to analyze the purpose of an abortion 
regulation prior to applying a balancing test is appropriate because it 
charges courts with evaluating whether a legitimate purpose exists for the 
law at the forefront of the analysis.  As opposed to assuming a law passes 
the scrutiny, as with rational basis analysis, rational basis with bite 
protects a woman’s abortion right by actually looking for a nexus 
between the stated ends and means to determine the law’s true 
legitimacy.  When courts analyze the purpose of abortion regulations 
under rational basis scrutiny, this rarely creates a barrier for unnecessary 
laws unsupported by a legitimate purpose.174  A rational basis with bite 
test, on the other hand, requires heightened scrutiny, and thus promotes a 
deeper inquiry into the law’s purpose.175  Therefore, use of this ends-
means scrutiny analysis recognizes that laws regulating abortion 
containing an invalid purpose are facially unconstitutional.176 
Courts should analyze the purpose of abortion laws under rational 
basis with bite because abortion rights parallel other rights that have 
caused courts to apply a heightened rational basis test.  While the 
Supreme Court has never specifically articulated what triggers use of a 
                                                          
 173.   Id. at 2300. 
 174.   Undue Burden Test in Texas, supra note 93. 
 175.   See Pettinga, supra note 158, at 799–800 (describing rational basis with bite as a form of 
heightened scrutiny as opposed to rational basis). 
 176.   See id. at 800 (noting that rational basis with bite leads to unconstitutional laws that would 
be valid under a rational basis analysis). 
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scrutiny mirroring rational basis with bite, the Court appears to apply it 
when it is hesitant to declare the use of strict scrutiny but believes there 
is action harming equality protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.177  
Additionally, scholars identify two triggers calling for heightened 
rational basis178—laws impacting targeted and vulnerable individuals and 
laws impacting important rights.179  Considering both the people abortion 
legislation impacts and the recognition of a woman’s right to an abortion 
as an important right demonstrates why rational basis with bite should be 
the first part of the test to determine the constitutionality of abortion 
regulations. 
First, those targeted by abortion regulations—both individual women 
receiving an abortion and abortion providers—are vulnerable groups of 
individuals, worthy of having laws impacting them scrutinized for 
legitimacy.  Rational basis with bite, a less deferential form of the 
rational basis test, has been used to invalidate laws when the Court 
suspects “animus” against a certain group.180  This analysis of individuals 
with a specific animus, or who otherwise lack political power, originated 
and is applied in Equal Protection cases.  However, even so, women 
seeking to exercise their right to an abortion still face a stigma, which 
should allow this heightened scrutiny to transfer over at the forefront of 
the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test.  Additionally, the Court’s 
initial willingness to analyze abortion laws under strict scrutiny further 
demonstrates the necessity of using some form of heightened inquiry to 
determine whether a law’s purpose is to create a substantial obstacle for a 
woman’s right to an abortion. 
                                                          
 177.   City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 471–72 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Freeman, supra note 93, at 302 (examining 
potential triggers of the rational basis with bite analysis).  
 178.   Freeman, supra note 93, at 302–03.  
 179.   Sarah Finnane Hanafin, Comment, Legal Shelter: A Case for Homelessness as a Protected 
Status Under Hate Crime Law and Enhanced Equal Protection Scrutiny, 40 STETSON L. REV. 435, 
468 (2011) (discussing the application of a “searching scrutiny” to laws impacting individuals who 
experience unfair treatment); Pettinga, supra note 158, at 801 (describing how rational basis with 
bite is triggered when “review[ing] legislation that burdens an important right of a group at least 
approaching quasi-suspect status”); see also Freeman, supra note 93, at 302–03 (explaining 
instances where courts have used a heightened rational basis review). 
 180.   See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (using a less 
deferential form of rational basis when evaluating the purpose of the Defense of Marriage Act and its 
effect on homosexuals); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (applying a less deferential form 
of rational basis to evaluate a law classifying homosexuals and declaring the law unconstitutional 
because it failed to further a “proper legislative end”); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (declaring a 
Texas law requiring a special permit for operating a group home for the mentally handicapped 
unconstitutional because it is based on an “irrational prejudice against the mentally [handicapped]”). 
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Furthermore, even though the Court no longer recognizes the 
abortion right as fundamental, the Court continues to recognize a 
woman’s right to an abortion as important.  In Casey, the language 
reflecting the Court’s desire to give “real substance to the woman’s 
liberty” to elect to have an abortion that stemmed from the “urgent 
claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and 
her body”181 acknowledges the substantial nature of the abortion right.  In 
addition to this passionate and empowering language, the Casey Court’s 
determination that states must have a legitimate, profound interest to 
interfere with this right signifies its importance.  Most recently, Whole 
Woman’s Health serves as a reminder of the importance of a woman’s 
right to an abortion.  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, confirmed 
this by explaining how the Fifth Circuit erroneously applied the rational 
basis analysis to the laws and that the circuit court was incorrect to apply 
a lower level of constitutional review where a protected personal liberty 
interest was at issue.182  Therefore, as abortion regulations impact women 
exercising their right to an abortion—an oftentimes unpopular group—
and the Court heralds the right to an abortion as important, it follows that 
using a rational basis with bite analysis in the undue burden test 
appropriately scrutinizes an abortion regulation’s purpose. 
3. The Balancing Component Adds Protection to a Woman’s Right to 
an Abortion 
While a rational basis with bite analysis affords more protection than 
a rational basis test under which the assumption is that a law will pass, 
even when an abortion regulation has a legitimate purpose, courts should 
continue the analysis to ensure that any burden created is not undue.  The 
appropriate mechanism for this is to apply the balancing test.  This 
balancing, demonstrated in Whole Woman’s Health and other judicial 
opinions,183 captures the appropriate method for protecting a woman’s 
abortion right by evaluating the interaction between the purpose and 
effects of an abortion regulation. 
The use of this balancing appropriately follows from Whole 
Woman’s Health, which stressed the importance of considering burdens 
and benefits together to evaluate the presence or absence of an undue 
burden.184  Doing so appropriately evaluates both the purpose and effects 
                                                          
 181.   Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 182.   Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016).  
 183.   See supra, Part II.B.2–3. 
 184.   Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10. 
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of a law.  It thus ensures that enacted regulations not only have an 
appropriate purpose, but are also necessary to achieve that interest, which 
depends “on whether and how well it serves the state’s interest.”185  
Focusing on the necessity of abortion regulations is not a new concept.  
In Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter recognized the 
necessity of abortion regulations,186 which in turn supports using a 
balancing approach to determine whether a law truly achieves the 
necessary purpose.  Use of a balancing test guarantees that laws 
furthering legitimate interests in potential life or protecting women’s 
health are calculated to achieve the purpose, rather than enact barriers to 
the right.  Thus, this protects the abortion right as a liberty interest, rather 
than a right that can be affected by laws having only a rational basis. 
Moreover, considering factual evidence of a law’s purpose and 
effects is necessary in the balancing test because this recognizes that 
similarly drafted regulations may impact the abortion right differently.  
An appropriate analysis of the undue burden test is context-specific, 
which will account for variances of circumstances affecting the severity 
of burdens and strength of justifications among states.187  As discussed 
by Justice O’Conner in Casey, lower courts engaging in a factual inquiry 
consisting of expert testimony, facts, empirical studies, and common 
sense are important to create consistent application of the undue burden 
standard.188  Courts fulfill their responsibility of protecting a woman’s 
liberty interest by relying on these forms of evidence, rather than giving 
great deference to the legislature.  Focusing on a factual inquiry, as 
opposed to legislative deference, supports the important function courts 
have in determining whether a burden on a woman’s right to an abortion 
is truly undue in light of the benefits incurred by enacting the legislation.  
This structured approach will result in courts exercising the appropriate 
amount of discretion, while ensuring states appropriately enact 
regulations with either the intent of protecting a mother’s health or the 
potential life of the fetus. 
                                                          
 185.   Planned Parenthood of Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (2014). 
 186.   See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion) (noting that unnecessary health regulations 
resulting in a substantial obstacle on abortion access imposes an undue burden).  
 187.   Humble, 753 F.3d at 914 (citing Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th 
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4. A Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test Parallels the Supreme 
Court’s Approach to Protecting Other Liberty Interests 
Using a balancing test, preceded by a rational basis with bite 
analysis, to determine the constitutionality of abortion regulations is 
appropriate not only because it affords the appropriate protection to a 
woman’s right to an abortion but also because it fits well within the 
context of liberty interest jurisprudence.  Although liberty interests do 
not receive the same level of protection as fundamental rights, since 
courts do not evaluate laws impacting liberty interests under strict 
scrutiny,189 the Supreme Court has demonstrated a trend to afford liberty 
interests a level of protection above rational basis review.  Notably, these 
tests reflect the Court’s willingness to implement a balancing approach to 
evaluating legislation impacting liberty interests.  When using this 
balancing approach to evaluate a state action’s burdens on liberty 
interests, courts determine whether constitutional rights have been 
violated by weighing the burden on the right against the relevant interest 
asserted by the state.190  Thus, using a balancing approach for the undue 
burden evaluation of abortion regulations appropriately protects both a 
woman’s right to abortion access and the state’s interests.  As such, a 
balancing approach follows the Supreme Court’s trend of using 
balancing tests to evaluate laws impacting the recognized liberty interests 
in bodily integrity and intimate relationships. 
a. The Abortion Right Parallels an Individual’s Liberty Interest in 
Bodily Integrity 
In recent decades, the Court has recognized an individual’s liberty 
interest in bodily integrity.  When the Court recognized this interest in 
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,191 the Court provided support 
for use of a liberty interest balancing test.  By neither labeling the right 
as “fundamental,” nor suggesting the use of a lower level of scrutiny, the 
Court left the approach to this liberty interest open to interpretation.  
Within the case, the Court declared a person has a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse unwanted medical care found under the liberty 
of the due process clause.192  Following this recognition, however, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion also accepted that states have an 
                                                          
 189.   See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 190.   See supra Part III.C.3; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). 
 191.   497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
 192.   Id. 
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interest in both protecting life and ensuring that an individual truly wants 
to end treatment before the decision to suspend it is made.193  
Specifically, he noted Missouri could “legitimately seek to safeguard the 
personal element of [ending treatment] through the imposition of 
heightened evidentiary requirements.”194  With this statement, Cruzan 
represents that to determine whether a law unconstitutionally burdens 
this liberty interest, a court must weigh the evidence demonstrating an 
individual’s interest in ending medical treatment against the state’s 
inherent interest in life and ascertaining the validity of the individual’s 
desires.  Therefore, this opinion represents the necessity of using a form 
of balancing test to evaluate regulations impacting any liberty interest, 
especially those involving highly personal decisions and the state’s, 
possibly conflicting, interests. 
The parallels between the language used when analyzing abortion 
regulations and the language the majority used in Cruzan demonstrate 
how the analogous nature of the two liberty interests warrants a parallel 
test be used to evaluate the two types of regulations.  Similar to abortion 
jurisprudence where states have a recognized interest in both protecting a 
mother’s health and an interest in the potential life of the fetus, states 
have an interest in both protecting life and ensuring that a patient truly 
desired to end treatment.  Additionally, the Court also recognized that 
this choice is “deeply personal,”195 a concept frequently used when 
discussing a woman’s right to an abortion.196  The Court further 
demonstrated the connection between abortion jurisprudence and bodily 
integrity when, in its Casey opinion, it cited Cruzan as a case 
exemplifying how the state’s legitimate interest in protecting life does 
not result in complete denials of individual liberty claims.197  Thus, these 
similarities naturally lead to the appropriateness of using a comparable 
balancing approach to analyzing the competing burdens and benefits 
proffered in regard to abortion regulations. 
                                                          
 193.   Id. at 281–82. 
 194.   Id. at 281. 
 195.   Id. at 281. 
 196.   See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (discussing 
how abortion is a matter “involving [a] most intimate and personal choice[]”).  
 197.   Id. at 857 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278).  
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b. The Abortion Right Is Similar to an Individual’s Liberty Interest in 
Intimate Relationships 
When the Court began recognizing an individual’s right to privacy in 
the form of intimate sexual relationships, the Court employed a similar 
test in cases involving an individual’s right to end medical care.  In 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court also arguably applied a balancing test in 
the context of homosexual sodomy.198  After recognizing intimate sexual 
relationships are within the right of privacy, and thus a protected liberty 
interest, the Court declared a Texas state law banning homosexual 
conduct to be unconstitutional.199  In doing so, the majority again neither 
explicitly articulated a scrutiny or framework used to determine the law’s 
unconstitutionality.  However, the Court demonstrated a type of 
balancing in its evaluation of the law.  The Court exhibited this balancing 
by searching for whether a legitimate state interest existed which could 
“justify [Texas’s] intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”200  Affirming that Texas viewing “a particular practice as 
immoral [was] not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice,”201 the Court found the law did not further a state interest, and 
thus was unconstitutional.202  Here, the Court’s use of “justify” and 
“sufficient”203 demonstrates that some legitimate interests will outweigh 
the state’s intrusion into an individual’s personal and private life, while 
others will fall flat. 
With this decision, the Court recognized the necessity of using a 
balancing test to assess the tumultuous relationship between a state and 
an individual’s liberty interest in a right to privacy.  Recognizing the 
need for balancing signifies the trend of using balancing tests to assess 
the constitutionality of laws impacting liberty interests protected by the 
Due Process Clause once a court finds the law furthers a legitimate state 
interest.  A woman’s right to an abortion and an individual’s right to 
sexual intimacy are similar because both involve a degree of choice that 
the state also has an interest in.  Whereas the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
 198.   539 U.S. 558, 577–79 (2003). 
 199.   Id. at 578.  
 200.   Id. 
 201.   Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
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sodomy.  Id. at 579–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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recognized the state’s interest in protecting unborn life and a woman’s 
health in the realm of abortion, the Court has similarly recognized that 
states have an interest in controlling certain aspects of sexual intimacy.204  
Therefore, it follows that incorporating a balancing test to analyzing 
abortion legislation follows the Court’s trend of recognizing that, if 
justifiable, strong legitimate state interests can outweigh burdens on an 
individual’s constitutionally protected liberty interest. 
At this point in time, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its intent 
to recognize a woman’s right to an abortion as a protected liberty 
interest.205  The Court has neither made any attempt to revert back to its 
analysis in Roe and recognize this right as fundamental—protected by 
strict scrutiny—nor has it indicated this right is left unprotected by the 
Constitution.206  With this trend, the Court will continue to recognize a 
woman’s right to an abortion as a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest.  Therefore, similar to an individual’s liberty interest in refusing 
medical treatment and having intimate sexual relationships, analyzing 
abortion regulations under the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test 
appropriately fits within the Supreme Court’s broader approach to 
understanding, recognizing, and protecting individuals’ liberty interests. 
5. Applying the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test to Abortion 
Regulations 
a. The Importance of Consistently Applying the Rational Basis with 
Bite Balancing Test 
There is a great necessity for courts to apply the balancing test 
approach to the undue burden test consistently among all types of 
abortion regulations.  Courts should not differentiate between protecting 
a legitimate interest in human life and a legitimate interest in the 
woman’s health.  Although these interests are different at their core, 
differentiating the two would result in an inconsistent mechanism for 
evaluating abortion regulations.  Furthermore, because the Rational Basis 
with Bite Balancing Test creates a higher burden for abortion regulations 
to overcome, applying a different process of evaluating the regulation 
                                                          
 204.   See id. at 578 (discussing that the case did not involve minors, persons who could be 
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implicitly would serve to place a fluctuating level of importance on a 
woman’s right to abortion access. 
The Court in Whole Woman’s Health specifically applied a balancing 
test to legislation enacted with the stated purpose of serving a state’s 
legitimate interest in the health of a mother.207  It is important to note 
that, unlike the regulations introduced by H.B. 2, other laws do not 
necessarily have the effect of closing abortion clinics and resulting in an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.208  Instead, these laws 
may impact a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion by limiting the types 
of abortions medical providers can perform, requiring multiple visits to a 
clinic, increasing costs, or requiring women receive information 
regarding the impact of an abortion.  As such, applying a Rational Basis 
with Bite Balancing Test to dismemberment abortion bans demonstrates 
how this test can serve as a framework to determine the constitutionality 
of these laws by scrutinizing the law’s purpose and the relationship 
between the purpose and effects. 
b. Evaluating Dismemberment Abortion Bans Using the Rational Basis 
with Bite Balancing Test 
States, including Kansas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Alabama, have 
recently started introducing legislation and enacting laws known as 
dismemberment abortion bans.209  Dismemberment abortions are 
generally defined as “knowingly dismembering a living unborn child and 
extracting such unborn child one piece at a time from the uterus.”210  This 
definition encompasses abortions known as dilation and evacuation (“D 
& E”) procedures, which are the primary means of an abortion for 
women receiving an abortion during the second trimester.211  Under the 
Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test, these laws may be 
unconstitutional. 
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An analysis under only the rational basis with bite prong is likely not 
indicative of whether a law is unconstitutional, which results in an 
application of both prongs of the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing 
Test.  Protecting fetal life exists as the legitimate purpose for 
dismemberment abortion bans.212  With this legitimate end, any ban on 
abortion will be strongly connected to this goal by limiting abortions and 
respecting human life.213  While the legitimate purpose of respecting fetal 
life exists for dismemberment bans, the means used to achieve this 
purpose indicates the possibility of these laws serving as a pretext for 
placing obstacles in the path of women to have an abortion during the 
second trimester.  Here, the language in dismemberment abortion ban 
regulations not only graphically describes the procedure, but is broad 
enough to include D & E procedures.214  Therefore, the over 
inclusiveness reveals that while the laws may achieve a legitimate 
purpose, this end may serve as a pretext. 
As the rational basis with bite analysis will unlikely invalidate 
dismemberment abortion bans, a balancing of the benefits and burdens 
analysis is the next step in determining whether dismemberment abortion 
bans create an undue burden.  First, banning a type of abortion is 
connected with the legitimate interest of protecting the life of unborn 
child, which demonstrates a benefit.  However, the success of achieving 
this purported benefit may be considered slight because only about ten 
percent of abortions occur during the second trimester; most women 
receive abortions during the first trimester.215  For example, in Kansas, 
second-trimester D & E procedures accounted for approximately eight 
percent of abortions during 2014.216  Therefore, these laws will result in 
few procedures actually being affected, detracting from the strength of 
the benefits. 
                                                          
 212.   See supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
158 (2007) (explaining how the state may regulate procedures to further its legitimate interest in 
“regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn”). 
 213.   See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158 (noting that D & E procedures are “laden with the power to 
devalue human life”); see also Bridges, supra note 47, at 1334–37 (2013) (discussing the strength of 
the state’s interest in protecting fetal life).  
 214.   For an example of language in a statute that has now been called into question, see, e.g., 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6742(b)(1) (Supp. 2016), which defines “dismemberment abortion” as 
“knowingly dismembering a living unborn child and extracting such unborn child one piece at a time 
from the uterus through the use of clamps, grasping forceps, tongs, scissors or similar instruments 
that, through the convergence of two rigid levers, slice, crush or grasp a portion of the unborn child’s 
body in order to cut or rip it off.” 
 215.   Hodes & Nauser, 368 P.3d at 669.   
 216.   Lithwick, supra note 210. 
2017 MAKING SENSE OF WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 793 
While the purpose and benefits created by dismemberment abortion 
bans reflect a legitimate interest in protecting the life of the unborn, they 
also generate burdens on a woman’s access to abortion.  Women will 
face heavy burdens with the inability to elect D & E procedures because 
D & E procedures account for at least ninety-five percent of second-
trimester abortions.217  Moreover, D & E procedures are recognized as 
the safest procedure for terminating second-trimester pregnancies.  In the 
absence of D & E procedures, women seeking a second-trimester 
abortion will be faced with alternatives such as a medically induced 
labor, which risk more complications than D & Es.218  Thus, 
dismemberment bans result in women having fewer safe alternatives. 
After the determination of the benefits and burdens of 
dismemberment abortion bans occurs, the two must be balanced to 
determine whether an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion 
exists.  A weighing of the burdens against the benefits suggests that 
while a legitimate purpose exists for enacting the laws, few actual 
benefits exist.  As D & Es account for very few abortion procedures, this 
suggests that the benefits legislatures propose may not outweigh the 
resulting burdens.  Conversely, women seeking to obtain a second-
trimester abortion would face many burdens on abortion access because 
they would be required to seek alternative, potentially more dangerous 
procedures.  Thus, under a balancing of the benefits and burdens, there is 
potential the benefits do not account for the burden, resulting in an undue 
burden.  Therefore, under a Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test, 
dismemberment laws may create an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
an abortion and be unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
By not approving the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey’s 
analysis of abortion regulations as requiring only a rational basis scrutiny 
and instead demonstrating a weighing of the benefits and burdens of 
abortion regulations, the Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health 
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paved the way for a new era of abortion jurisprudence.  The decision 
indicates that courts no longer can evaluate the purpose and effects of the 
legislation separately.  Instead, courts must ensure that the legislation’s 
purpose is necessary and justified in light of the burdens it creates.  
Therefore, in deciding Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated its desire to continue recognizing a woman’s right to an 
abortion as a protected liberty interest and to not shirk in affording this 
right the protection it demands. 
Using Whole Women’s Health as a mechanism for the development 
of a Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test demonstrates the need to 
continue to protect a woman’s liberty interest in her right to an abortion.  
By first searching for a nexus between a law’s stated purpose in 
achieving a state’s legitimate interest and the means it uses to accomplish 
these ends, courts at the forefront ensure the legitimacy of the regulations 
purpose.  With courts focusing on verifiable evidence and giving less 
deference to legislatures, the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test 
prevents unnecessary abortion laws from hiding in the shadows of 
purported legitimate interests that only exist to cover the actual 
illegitimate purposes of many forms of abortion legislation.  As the 
Court’s make-up hangs in the balance, uncertainty looms as to whether 
the trend will be to continue protecting a woman’s right to an abortion.219  
However, unless the Court chooses to overturn years of abortion 
jurisprudence, the Rational Basis with Bite Balancing Test appropriately 
protects a woman’s right to abortion while remaining true to abortion 
regulation precedent. 
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